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Abstract:  
 
The scientific literature has extensively studied and analyzed the determinants of risks 
management and focused mainly on the hedging by derivatives. This research focuses on 
another kind of hedging, namely business insurances and aims to validated and measure the 
determinants of the implementation and use of these insurances in the non-financial firms. 
Based on the results of an empirical survey on practices of risk management in non- financial 
firms, Tobit models are developed to explain the intensity of the use of business insurances by 
the theoretical determinants developed by risk management theory.  
Two types of business insurance are analyzed: the Property and Casualty (P&C) Insurance 
and the Operating Loss (OL) Insurance. These models measure the relationship between level 
of hedging and different financial characteristics of the firm. They show that the insurance 
policies are determined by Investment decisions and financing options for growth, by the 
convexity of the tax function to pay, and diversification and regulation of the activity sector, 
and the original result are the convex relationship between the size and the hedging intensity. 
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1. Introduction: 
 
 
Economic theory tells us that market imperfections lead companies to hedge against risks 
(Aretz, and Dufey Bartram, 2007). A large literature deals with the issue of risk management 
and more generally, the research into the determinants of hedging have been widely discussed 
by academics (Aretz et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2006; Kaushik, 2008; Al Momani and 
Gharaibeh, 2008), this literature review of empirical research revealed the determinants of 
risk coverage and the Risk Management Theory (RMT) classifies these determinants into 
three categories, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Aretz, Bartram and Dufey, (2007) Rawls 
and Smithson (1990) and Stulz (2002). The first category is related to the assumption of the 
maximization of corporate value. The second category of determinants is related to the 
assumption of utility maximization managers. The third and final category includes the size of 
the company and the economies of scale. 
 
 
Thus, this scientific literature has sought to highlight the determinants of risk coverage by 
focusing mainly on financial risks – such as commodity risk, interest-rate risk, or exchange-
rate risk - in one hand and on derivatives on the other hand. So the development of derivatives 
has improved the methods of risk management. The use of derivatives is now widespread, the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2009) reports that over 94% of the world’s 
largest companies use derivatives to help manage their risks. The widespread use of 
derivatives for hedging must not lead us to overlook other means of managing financial risk. 
Although derivatives have become a reference in the hedging tools world (Nance et al., 1993; 
Judge, 2006). 
 
However over the last ten years, corporate risk management has expanded well beyond 
derivatives and the hedging of financial exposures to include a variety of other kinds of risk—
notably operational risk, reputational risk, and, most recently, strategic risk. So Firms face 
different kind of risks that financial, and they use insurance to manage some of them.  
 
Historically, insurance is a primarily tool of risk management (Vaughan, 1997). More 
particularly, Business Insurance is defined as a coverage that protects businesses from losses 
due to events that may occur during the normal course of business. There are many types of 
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insurance for businesses including coverage for property damage, legal liability and 
employee-related risks (Zeckhauser, 2008). Companies evaluate their insurance needs based 
on potential risks, which can vary depending on the type of environment in which the 
company operates. Within business insurance, we can then identify Property and Casualty 
(P&C) Insurance and the Operating Loss (OL) Insurance. 
 
Property insurance provides protection against most risks to property, such as fire, theft and 
some weather damage. This includes specialized forms of insurance such as fire insurance, 
flood insurance, earthquake insurance, home insurance, or boiler insurance. Casualty 
insurance is often equated to liability insurance. It is mainly liability coverage of an individual 
or organization for negligent acts or omissions. 
 
A company, which consistently generates operating losses, will require the Operating Loss 
Insurance (OL) in order to avoid bankruptcy. The net loss recorded as a result of a company's 
unprofitable operation, considering only the company's operating income versus its operating 
expenditures. An operating loss does not consider the effects of interest income, interest 
expense or taxes, but in some cases includes depreciation expense.  
 
Thus, the risks can be covered by insurance or derivatives in function of their nature. The 
theory of risk management explains more precisely the implementation of derivatives by the 
three determinants cited above, which are the maximization of the value of the company, the 
maximization of utility manager and economies of scale. There is a rich scientific literature 
that has validated the above theory to the use of derivatives, but few researches have tested 
this theory on insurance products. This is the goal of this article. 
 
The main hypothesis of this research is to verify that the use of business insurance is 
explained by risk management theory. Thus the determinants of setting up a business 
insurance could be the maximization of the value of the company, the maximization of 
managers utility and economies of scale. For a better explanation, this hypothesis can be 
divided into two; the first hypothesis verified in the implementation of the P&C insurance is 
explained by the RM theory. The second hypothesis checks that the implementation of the OL 
insurance is explained by the RM theory. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical determinants of RM 
theory, the corporate demands of hedging and details all the consequent hypotheses. Section 3 
presents the research method and the empirical sample. Section 4 develops tobit models to 
explain and measure the determinants of the P&C and OL insurances, and discusses the 
results. Finally, the conclusion discusses the limitations and perspectives of this research. 
 
 
2. Theoretical determinants of hedging and Research hypotheses:  
 
The theoretical debate on the determinants of risk management by non-financial firms has 
arisen following the introduction of market frictions in the classic model of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) on optimal capital structure. As part of their assumptions (the absence of market 
imperfections: the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and transaction costs), the authors 
argue that risk management is a redundant activity and does not affect the value of the firm. 
Thus, if capital markets are perfect, the shareholders have the necessary information about the 
company’s exposure to risks, and the tools to create their desired risk profiles; in this 
environment, there is no reason for hedging to be carried out by the firm.  
 
Empirical research has tested the individual or full set of neoclassical assumptions made by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Through various surveys, other researchers have verified that 
financial structure directly affects the value of the company, and that being heavily indebted 
could be less valuable than being a “healthy” company, all other things being equal 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Guay and Kothari, 2003; Brown et al., 2006; Graham and 
Rogers, 2002; Nain, 2004; Kaushik, 2008; Al Momani and Gharaibeh, 2008; Ben Khediri, 
2006; Bodnar and Marston, 1998; De Ceuster et al., 2002, Grant and Marshall, 2002).  
 
This empirical research highlights these determinants and their approximate variables, which 
can be categorized them into three points: 
 
First category: determinants related to the assumption of maximizing the value of the firm 
(Graham and Rogers, 2002; Dwarf, 2004; Carter et al., 2004. These include: 
• Investment decisions and financing options for growth and the problem of 
underinvestment. Hedging allows the firm to gain access to internal funds available 
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when attractive investment opportunities arise. If the costs of external financing are 
higher than those of internal financing, a firm with an investment project has a greater 
probability of covering in order to stabilize itself and so avoid borrowing on the 
capital market. This is in accordance with the pecking-order theory. Approximated by 
the following variable(s): market value/book value, quick ratio (assets liquidatable 
within one year minus debts due within one year), R&D/sales ratio and EBIT/ sales. 
 
• The convexity of the tax function to pay. Hedging serves to reduce the variability of 
firm value or profits before tax, the anticipatory tax rate is reduced, and therefore the 
value of the firm after tax is increased, as the costs of coverage are not too high. It is 
better to have stable taxable income over time rather than having very random taxable 
income. Approximated by the following variable(s): reported-loss/total-assets ratio. 
 
• The costs of financial distress associated with leverage and restrictive covenants 
related to debt. With the increase of the value of the firm, the probability of creditors 
being paid is higher and the remaining portion of shareholders increases. Thus, the 
costs of financial distress are negatively related with the residual part of the firm. As 
hedging decreases, the variability of the future value of a leveraged firm and the 
probability of incurring financial distress costs are therefore reduced. Approximated by 
the following variable(s): earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)/interest expenses, 
and total debt/equity. 
 
These determinants and their variables have the following theoretical relation with the 
implementation of hedging. 
 
Table 1: Hypothetical relations between first category of determinants and hedging 
Determinants and ratio Relation 
Investment decisions and growth option  
Market value/book value + 
Quick ratio: liquid assets within one year minus 
debts due within one year 
- 
R&D/sales ratio + 
EBIT/ sales + 
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Tax  
Reported-loss/total-assets ratio + 
Financial distress  
EBIT/interest expenses - 
Total debt/equity + 
 
According to the main hypothesis of this research, the first sub-hypothesis that can be 
created with this determinant has two levels, the first one, is about the determinant of Property 
and Casualty (P&C) Insurance, the second one, is about the determinant of Operating Loss 
(OL) Insurance. 
 
H1.1: The implementation of Property and Casualty (P&C) Insurance is determined by 
the assumption of maximizing the value of the firm overall.   
H1.2: The implementation of Operating Loss (OL) Insurance is determined by the 
assumption of maximizing the value of the firm overall.   
 
Second category: determinants related to the assumption of managers maximizing utility 
(Aretz et al., 2007). These include: 
• Problems and agency costs, risk aversion of managers, and the ability of managers. 
According to agency theory, risk-averse managers who hold a large proportion of 
shares in the company they work for have an expected utility of wealth that is 
significantly affected by the variance in expected profits of the firm. As the shares 
provide a linear function of profit, these managers (as shareholders) will want to 
minimize the volatility of their profits. So, they take the opportunity to reduce some of 
the specific risks to which they are exposed. The more that managers own shares in 
the company, the greater the probability that the company uses hedging activities. 
Approximated by the following variable(s): number of stock options held by managers, 
number of stock held by managers and dividend yield.  
 
These determinants and their variables have the following theoretical relation with the 
implementation of hedging. 
 
Table 2: Hypothetical relation between second category of determinants and hedging 
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Determinants and ratio Relation 
Agency cost  
Number of stock options held by managers ? 
Number of shares held by managers ? 
Dividend yield ? 
 
 
According to the main hypothesis of this research, the second sub-hypothesis can be 
created with this determinant has two levels, the first one, is about the determinant of Property 
and Casualty (P&C) Insurance, the second one, is about the determinant of Operating Loss 
(OL) Insurance. 
H2.1: The implementation of Property and Casualty (P&C) Insurance is determined by 
the assumption of managers maximizing utility.   
H2.2: The implementation of Operating Loss (OL) Insurance is determined by the 
assumption of managers maximizing utility.   
 
Third category: economies of scale (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Guay and Kothari, 2003; 
Brown et al., 2006). These include: 
• Economies of scale and size of the company (Judge, 2006; Ben Khediri, 2006; Mefteh 
2005), and diversification. Economies of scale are an important factor in the decision 
on whether to hedge. Generally, larger firms have sophisticated financial strategies, 
whether or not they use derivatives. In addition, trading on the derivatives market 
requires heavy capital outlays, meaning that small firms will find it more difficult to 
participate, mainly because of their low liquidity. The determinant related to the size 
of the firm is approximated by the following variable(s): Ln (total assets), and assets 
excluding sector/total assets. 
 
• Regulation and control industry. Firms that operate in a regulatory environment have 
less flexibility in their investment decisions, and firms that have less flexibility in their 
investment decisions have fewer agency costs and lower costs related to loan 
agreements. Therefore, these firms will be less likely to hedge. Approximated by the 
following variable(s): Binary (regulated = 1, otherwise = 0). 
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These determinants and their variables have the following theoretical relation with the 
implementation of hedging. 
 
Table 3: Hypothetical relationship between third category of determinants and hedging 
Determinants and ratio Relation 
Size and economies of scale  
Ln (total assets) ? 
Diversification  
Off-area assets/total assets - 
Regulation  
Binary (1= regulatory sector, 0 = not) - 
 
According to the main hypothesis of this research, the third sub-hypothesis can be created 
with this determinant has two levels, the first one, is about the determinant of Property and 
Casualty (P&C) Insurance, the second one, is about the determinant of Operating Loss (OL) 
Insurance. 
 
H3.1: The implementation of Property and Casualty (P&C) Insurance is determined by 
the assumption of economies of scale.   
H3.2: The implementation of Operating Loss (OL) Insurance is determined by the 
assumption of economies of scale.   
 
This section has presented the determinants of hedging and their approximated variables. It 
allows us to model the decision on whether or not to use hedging and to explain this using the 
variables presented above. This kind of model is used for explaining the implementation of 
business insurances by the theoretical determinant of hedging. 
 
 
3. Research method and empirical survey  
 
An empirical investigation was conducted to observe the different ways in which financial 
risk management is developed and implemented by non-financial firms. This survey was 
conducted in the same way as the empirical investigations of risk management initiated by 
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Bodnar and Marston (1998), De Ceuster et al. (2002), and Grant and Marshall (2002). It was 
conducted as part of a doctoral thesis on a sample of 400 French non-financial companies. 
The sample was drawn at random according to a double stratification by size and industry, 
from a base INSEE database. 
 
The questionnaires were sent to 1,200 companies by post, and then followed up with 
telephone calls. This double collection (by post and telephone) produced a response rate of 
almost 33%, with a usable sample of 401 companies. The collection of information was 
completed in June 2010; the entire survey took more than a year. 
  
The questionnaire was sent to CFOs and collected information on risk-management and 
insurance practices. It consisted of two parts: The first part looked at the organization of risk 
management and resources allocated to this function, and the second part focused on different 
strategies for measuring, evaluating, and hedging financial and operational risks. A first 
version of the questionnaire was constructed on the basis of questionnaires used by De 
Ceuster et al. (2002) and Judge (2006), and was then tested and adapted in a survey 
undertaken during the author’s master’s degree year. 
 
We present below the first results of this survey.  
 
Table 4: Types of firms 
 Number % 
Listed firms 269 67 
Unlisted firms 132 33 
 401 100 
	  
The first analysis of the sample is by type of company: listed or unlisted (Table I). This is 
emphasized because the majority of research has focused on the behavior of listed companies. 
 
Table 5: Distribution of firms by size (total assets) 
Size (€K) 
 
Number % 
0–5,000 37 9 
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5,001–10,000 35 9 
10,001–50,000 94 23 
50,001–100,000 96 24 
Over 100,000 139 35 
 401 100 
 
The second analysis is by size of company, as shown above (Table 5). Unlike most research, 
this study is therefore concerned with all sizes of businesses: small, medium, and large. 
 
Based on the theoretical determinants of hedging (as seen in the previous section), financial 
ratios were constructed from another source, a database called Point Risk. This database, 
distributed by the Altares Institute, offers access to a vast database of over 2.15 million 
French companies. It validates the status of each company, and carries a ten-year history of 
annual accounts, with 8 million balance sheets and 925 search criteria available. 
 
The results of the survey showed the following distribution of these approximated variables of 
the determinants presented above. 
 
Table 6: Financial ratios 
Determinants and ratio Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Investment decisions and growth option    
Market value/book value 3.7100 2.2100 6.2215 
Quick ratio: liquid assets within one year minus 
debts due within one year 
1.6230 0.9800 2.3067 
R&D/sales ratio 2.2449 0.3400 4.0622 
EBIT/ sales 3.4536 3.9675 2.9856 
Tax    
Reported-loss/total-assets ratio 0.3952 1.0500 0.4115 
Financial distress    
EBIT/interest expenses 5.3144 4.0800 3.0457 
Total debt/equity 0.7421 1.1500 1.2198 
Agency cost    
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Number of stock options held by managers 0.1640 0.3200 0.2664 
Number of shares held by managers 0.6237 0.8432 0.4345 
Dividend yield 7.0675 3.0786 3.6573 
Size and economies of scale    
Ln (total assets) 4.4532 6.3456 6.3464 
Diversification    
Off-area assets/total assets 0.3345 0.2800 0.2075 
Regulation    
Binary (1= regulatory sector, 0 = not) 0.3461 0.6542 0.2345 
 
We note that these statistics (Table 6) are significantly lower than those calculated in 
comparable surveys, such as those by De Ceuster et al. (2002), Grant and Marshall (2002), 
Judge (2006), and Ben Khediri (2006). This difference is due to the originality of our sample, 
which contains small business (unlike other surveys, which cover only major listed firms). 
 
 
Tableau 7: Type of business insurances used by non-financial firms 
 Number % 
P&C Insurance 344 91.5 
OL Insurance 181 48.2 
               Total 376  
 
Nearly 94% of non-financial companies implement Business insurances to cover various 
operational risks (fire, explosion,...) according to the FFSA (Fédération Française des Sociétés 
d’Assurance) this rate should be close to 100%. Specifically, 91.5% of companies use P&C 
insurance and 48.2% of companies use OL insurance. Both operational risk management 
means are not exclusive. 
 
 
Tableau 8: Amount of hedging by business insurances used by non-financial firms. 
 Mean  (106 euros) St Deviation  
P&C Insurance 1394.50 187.12 
OL Insurance 2127.00 295.42 
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The average amounts covered by P&C insurance are 1,394.5 million euros. The average 
amount covered by the OL insurance is about 2,127.00 million euros. These statistics 
represent the level or degree of coverage of such insurance. 
 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL MODELS: 
 
To measure the effect of the determinants of the development and intensity of insurance 
coverage by non-financial companies, two of Tobit models are developed. Both models are 
developed according to the type of insurance policy. Model I seeks to explain the 
determinants of the intensity of the hedging of the P&C Insurance. Model II, meanwhile, 
explains the determinants of the intensity of the hedging of OL insurance. 
 
In each model, the dependent variable Y * is measured by the total amount covered by the 
insurance reported total assets. The independent variables Xi are the variables approximate 
theoretical determinants presented above and correspond to the determinants developed by the 
scientific literature to explain the financial risk management.  
 
The model takes the following form: Y∗ = βX! + µμ    where  N (O,σ!) Y! = Y!∗  if  Y!∗ > 0 Y! = 0   if not 
 
The estimations by maximum likelihood method are:  
 
Tableau 9: Quality indicators 
Indicators Model I.1 Model I.2 Model II.1 Model II.2 
AIC 
SC 
-2Log L 
Pseudo R! 
13,6343 
11.2234 
3056.3345 
0.561 
12,6545 
11.0034 
3207.845 
0.441 
11,9564 
10.5634 
3845.5564 
0.489 
11,2967 
10.8564 
3784.7756 
0.467 
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Note for different models; AIC is between 13.63 and 11.29. SC is between 11.22 and 10.56. 
The - 2 log likelihood ratio is between are 3784.77 and 3056.33. Pseudo R2 is between 0.56 
and 0.44. These statistics confirm that the quality of the models is good. 
 
 
 Tableau 10: Models’ coefficients. 
 Model I.1 Model I.2 Model II.1 Model II.2 
Constant  1.6342  1.5546  0.3423  0.5634 
Market value/book value  0.7656**  0.6745*  1.2234**  1.3412* 
Quick ratio: liquid assets within one 
year minus debts due within one year 
 0.7989**  0.8234*  1.3365**  0.9856* 
R&D/sales   0.7563*  0.7765**  1.1287**  0.8456** 
EBIT/ sales  0.6532*  0.8234*  0.9867*  0.9945* 
Reported-loss/total-assets   0.3984  0.4532  0.8456  0.7345 
EBIT/interest expenses -0.9871 -0.8564 -0.3245 -0.6453 
Total debt/equity  0.8566*  0.9534*  0.9561*  0.9561* 
Number of stock options held by 
managers 
 0.4196  0.5523  0.6643  0.7456 
Number of shares held by managers  0.3456  0.2345  0.5634*  0.6753* 
Dividend yield  0.44523  0.3424  0.2344  0.4231 
Ln (total assets)  1.6343    1.3421   
Ln (total assets)2    0.4218**    0.5586** 
Off-area assets/total assets -0.3425 -0.5672 -1.0674 -1.2345 
Binary (1= regulatory sector, 0 = not) -0.4453* -0.3346* -1.8756* -1.5343* 
*     significant at 5% 
**   significant at 1% 
 
 
First analysis indicates that the variable size is not significant. Which contradicts the theory of 
financial economies of scale. To find a relationship between the size and hedging by 
insurance, variable size square - (ln (total assets))2 - is introduced into the vector of 
explanatory variables for the models I2 and II2. Otherwise, Market value/book value ratio, 
quick ratio, R&D/sales, EBIT/ sales, Total debt/equity and regulatory sector are significant 
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for all models. Number of shares held by managers is significant just for models II. The 
square of size is significant, this result shows the convexity of the size in the intensity of the 
coverage of operational risk. These are smaller as larger companies tend to good hedge 
against operational risk and therefore there is no economy of scale for this type of risk as 
opposed to financial risk. 
 
We have to note the observed relation between the variables/determinants and the explanatory 
variable (hedging). The relation of Market value/book value ratio, R&D/sales, EBIT/ sales, 
Total debt/equity, regulatory sector, number of shares held by managers and size, with 
hedging are in accordance with the theory, but it’s not the case of the quick ratio. It presents a 
negative relationship with hedging. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The aim of this article is to verify that the use of business insurance is explained by risk 
management theory. Thus the determinants of setting up business insurance could be the 
maximization of the value of the company, the maximization of managers’ utility and 
economies of scale. 
 
By modeling the relation between the amount of insurance businesses and financial structure, 
these empirical evidences allow to validate or note the research hypotheses.  
 
The first categories of hypotheses are:  
H1.1: The implementation of Property and Casualty (P&C) Insurance is determined by 
the assumption of maximizing the value of the firm overall.   
H1.2: The implementation of Operating Loss (OL) Insurance is determined by the 
assumption of maximizing the value of the firm overall.   
 
We note that, for the investment decisions and growth option determinant, Market value/book 
value, Quick ratio, R&D/sales, EBIT/ sales. So, in accordance with the model of Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993), insurance business allows the firm to access necessary and 
available internal funds when opportunities to present interesting investment and the costs of 
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external financing are higher than those of internal financing, a firm with an investment 
project has a higher probability to cover its cash flows, to stabilize and thus avoid to borrow 
on the capital market. But we have to note the negative relationship between quick ratio and 
hedging, in the case of insurance, liquidity has not the same role like with derivatives, 
because, liquidity is an alternative way to hedge against financial risks (judge, 2006).  
 
For tax determinant, no variables are significant. This theoretical determinant is not valid for 
insurance. Insurance don’t serves to reduce the variability of firm value or profits before tax, 
the anticipatory tax rate is reduced, and therefore the value of the firm after tax is not 
increased, as the costs of coverage are not too high. It is not necessarily better to have stable 
taxable income over time rather than having very random taxable income. 
 
For Financial distress, total debt/equity, in accordance with the model of Aretz, Bartram and 
Dufey (2007), Judge (2006) Bartram, Brown, Fehle, (2006), the costs of financial distress 
encourage companies to hedge. The higher the value of the firm, the greater the creditors have 
a high probability of being paid and the remaining portion of shareholders increases. 
Coverage decreases as the variability of the future value of a leveraged firm; the probability 
of incurring financial distress costs is therefore reduced. 
 
So, we can overall, validate H1.1 and H1.2 hypotheses.  
 
The second categories of hypotheses are:  
H2.1: The implementation of Property and Casualty (P&C) Insurance is determined by 
the assumption of managers maximizing utility.   
H2.2: The implementation of Operating Loss (OL) Insurance is determined by the 
assumption of managers maximizing utility.   
 
We observe that for determinant agency cost, the variable Number of shares held by managers 
is significant just for models II. So, we can validate agency theory, for LO insurance, risk-
averse managers who hold a large proportion of shares in the company they work for have an 
expected utility of wealth that is significantly affected by the variance in expected profits of 
the firm. As the shares provide a linear function of profit, these managers (as shareholders) 
	   16	  
will want to minimize the volatility of their profits. So, they take the opportunity to reduce 
some of the specific risks to which they are exposed.  
 
We validate only H2.2 hypothesis, and reject H2.1 Hypothesis. 
 
The third categories of hypotheses are:  
H3.1: The implementation of Property and Casualty (P&C) Insurance is determined by 
the assumption of economies of scale.   
H3.2: The implementation of Operating Loss (OL) Insurance is determined by the 
assumption of economies of scale.   
 
We observe a significant relationship between the size (square) and the implementation of 
insurance. This result is very original; there is convex relationship between insurance and size 
of firms. That means the small and the large firms use a lot of insurance P&C and OL, but the 
medium firms use less insurance.  
 
The hypotheses of economies of scale are not valid for P&C and OL insurances.  
 
Finally, we can note that, regulatory sector are determinant for using Business insurances. 
That is a natural, because the regulatory forces the firms to insure themselves. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research analyzed the implementation of two kind of business insurances, like P&C and 
OL insurance, and aim to measure the determinant this kind of hedging in the non-financial. 
The risk management theory is used to develop the determinant of hedging. Empirical models 
measure and validate one theoretical determinant, the assumption of maximizing value of the 
firm. The assumption of maximizing the utility of the manager is valid only for OL insurance. 
The assumption of economies of scale is note valid. But we have provided evidences for a 
convex relationship between the implementation of business insurance (P&C and OL) and the 
size of the firm.   
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The research has some limitations. These models present the hedging use as a result of its 
financial characteristics. Actually the internal environment (employees, shareholders) and 
external (competition, regulators) are also determinants of strategic choices. Thus, a research 
integrating these environmental aspects in addition to the financial characteristics will better 
measure and explain hedging strategies. 
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